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Background
Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) 
● Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) system must enable UAS to 
steer clear of potential collisions with other aircraft
● Replace the FAA’s “see-and-avoid” requirement when 
there is no pilot onboard with the same or better safety
○ How to quantify “well-clear”?
○ How to communicate with ATC and pilots-in-control?
○ How to interoperate with TCAS or ACAS-XU?
○ How to ...?
The Problem: 
How to build a model of DAA system that would help 
establish requirements to future DAA systems?
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Motivation
The Need:
Conflict detection and resolution algorithm for DAA system 
modeling
● Flexible 
to use as a testbed for evaluating new features of DAA 
systems
● Fast 
for real-time (human-in-the-loop) and faster than real-time 
(parametric and NAS-wide) simulations
● Lightweight
easy to integrate in our DAA system model
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GRACE Algorithm at a Glance
Flexible: open architecture
● Use any suitable trajectory predictor
● Configurable
○ separation standards
○ maneuver types (horizontal / vertical / speed)
○ cost functions
● Composed of two loosely coupled algorithms
○ Generic Conflict Evaluator (GCE)
○ Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA)
Fast: execution time ~ milliseconds
Lightweight: seamlessly integrated into DAA simulation
● Simple API and implementation
● Small jar with minimal dependencies
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Definitions:
● Ownship: aircraft controlled by DAA system
● Intruder: other aircraft that can create a collision threat
● Separation standard: a logical condition of safe separation
● Violation (loss of separation): violation of separation 
standard
● Threat: violation properties
○ Severity level
○ Closest Point of Approach (CPA)
○ Time of first loss of separation
○ ...
● NMAC: Near-Mid-Air-Collision / violation of NMAC zone
● Encounter (conflict): a flight situation resulting in violations 
occurred at least at some trajectory states 
Generic Conflict Evaluator (GCE)
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Accepts multiple separation standards configurable to 
cover the wide range of spatial and temporal scales
● Horizontal separation or Horizontal Miss Distance HMD
● Vertical separation VSEP
● Time metrics
○ tau or tauMod (tau with distance modifier DMOD)
○ altitude-dependent tau (as per TCAS sensitivity levels)
○ vertical tau (time to co-altitude)
○ time to CPA or to first loss of separation
Examples
● DAA Well Clear as defined by the Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA systems (expected to be 
published in June 2017):
HMD > DMOD = 0.66 nmi, VSEP > 450 ft, tauMod > 35 sec
● NMAC (as defined for TCAS): 500 ft x 100 ft
Generic Conflict Evaluator (GCE)
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Generic Conflict Evaluator (GCE)
Grid-based threat detection
1. Request predicted intruder trajectories at discrete time steps
2. Determine grid cell size from separation standards and max. speeds
3. Map intruders to grid cells (stored as a time sequence of hash maps)
4. Detect threats from intruders mapped to cells in proximity to ownship
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Bounding box based on 
separation standards 
> (max. speed) x (time step) 
Start from CPA for highest priority threat from GCE
Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA)
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Extrapolate trajectories backward from CPA 
Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA)
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Apply Simple Maneuver to linearized ownship trajectory
Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA)
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1. Increment control variable
2. Update velocity vector
3. Estimate new CPA
4. Check separation standard at new CPA
5. Still violation? Repeat
Apply Simple Maneuver to linearized ownship trajectory
Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA)
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1. Increment control variable
2. Update velocity vector
3. Estimate new CPA
4. Check separation standard at new CPA
5. No violation? Repeat one more time just 
to be sure
Re-evaluate the candidate resolution for all intruders
Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA)
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1. Last CPA becomes a Trajectory 
Change Point (TCP)
2. Pass TCP into GCE for re-evaluation
3. GCE uses the TCP as a constraint to 
generate the updated trajectory that is 
checked for violation
Re-evaluation failed?
● Yes: continue with the same 
Simple Maneuver
● No: remember a candidate 
resolution and apply next 
Simple Maneuver
Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA)
Find the best solution using a configurable cost function
● Threat of collision cost:
○ penalizes for collision threats from all intruders
○ naturally dominates when close to collision
● Maneuver change cost: penalizes frequent changes of 
maneuvers
● Rank cost: favors the right-of-way compliant maneuvers
● Maneuver strength cost: penalizes too aggressive 
maneuvers
● Other costs can be added if needed
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Evaluation of GRACE Algorithm
NAS-wide 24-hour study
● About 20K UAS missions distributed geographically and 
temporally (Ayyalasomayajula et al, 2013)
● VFR traffic based on recorded nation-wide radar data
● Transitional class E airspace
● Mix of cooperative and non-cooperative traffic
● DAA surveillance included a directional airborne radar 
with 8-nmi range
● Possible late detections by surveillance due to
○ “Noisy” VFR tracks
○ Limited sensor field of view
● Unknown intruder intent
● Separation standards based on DAA Well Clear
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Evaluation of GRACE Algorithm
Simulations
1. Unmitigated: detection only, no resolutions (baseline)
2. Mitigated: detection and resolutions with immediate 
execution and “recapture”
Metrics
● Violations: DAA Well Clear violated
● NMAC: NMAC separation standard violated
● Predicted: per cycle (at every simulation timestep)
● Actual: per encounter (at CPA)
● SNMAC: separation at CPA relative to NMAC: exceed 
100% for Actual NMAC; lower values correspond to 
larger separations
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Evaluation of GRACE Algorithm
● Mitigation substantially reduced the number of violations
● Remaining violations are mostly due to late detections 
by surveillance or unexpected intruder maneuvers
● Mitigation eliminated all actual NMACs
NAS-wide study: effect of mitigation
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Conclusion
GRACE Algorithm
● Met performance requirements of DAA simulations
● Validated and used to inform DAA MOPS in a number 
of
○ human-in-the-loop experiments
○ flight tests with live aircraft
○ NAS-wide simulations and parametric studies
● Can be used by manufacturers and developers of
○ decision support tools for pilots in command
○ systems for fully autonomous UAS DAA operations
○ research and automation software for manned flights
Future work
● Improve robustness of DAA resolutions, taking into 
account uncertainties of intruder positions and intent 18
Questions / Discussion
Contact
Michael Abramson
Senior Engineer
Crown Consulting Inc.
michael.abramson@nasa.gov
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Why GRACE?
General purpose conflict detection and 
resolution algorithm
● Fast and lean
● Designed without any assumptions regarding:
○ temporal and spatial scales
○ performance capabilities of aircraft
○ sensor and communication systems
○ degree of autonomy
● Can be used:
○ in decision support tools for ground pilots
○ in fully autonomous UAS DAA operations
○ potentially in manned flights
● Used extensively in research on UAS DAA systems
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Background
2012: The U.S. Congress mandated the “safe integration” of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Air Space (NAS)
2012: The FAA aviation rulemaking committee is looking into 
amending Part 91.113 that prescribes aircraft right-of-way rules, to 
allow for an electronic “Detect-and-Avoid” (DAA) system enabling 
UAS to steer clear of potential collisions with other aircraft
2013: The RTCA is developing the minimum operational 
performance standards (MOPS) for a UAS DAA System
2013: NASA developed a portable software system, Java 
Architecture for DAA Extensibility and Modeling (JADEM)
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Background
UAS Integration in the NAS: NASA Ames role
● determine the required information to be displayed in the Ground 
Control Station (GCS) to support the development of standards and 
guidelines through prototyping and simulation
● analyze integration of UAS control and communication system and 
ATC communications to validate recommendations for regulations 
and standards
● collect and analyze UAS hazard and risk related data to support 
safety case recommendations for the development of 
certification/regulations
● conduct a “virtual” type design certification effort to develop a “UAS 
playbook” for industry to obtain type design certificates
● develop a relevant test environment to support evaluation of UAS 
concepts and technologies using a Live Virtual Constructive – 
Distributed Environment (LVC DE)
● instantiate a GCS with display/information to demonstrate 
compliance with requirements
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Background
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JADEM
Design philosophy
Keep
It
Simple,
Stupid
● Simple interface and customization
● Few generic classes vs. many 
specialized classes
● Use Bridge and Adaptor design patterns
Don’t
Repeat
Yourself
● One system - many clients
● Unified unit conversion 
● Low-level flight data management
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JADEM
Services and spinoffs
● Grid-based mapping for any 2D targets
○ useful for fast search of “neighbors” in 2D space
● Unit conversion and operations with dimensional 
variables
○ time, space, speed, angle, and mass variables
● Generic flight data management classes
○ natural “language” to express any data, constraints, 
and operations for aircraft states and entire flights
● Multimodal Adaptable Trajectory Generator (MATG)
○ a general purpose TP, more flexible than others
● Generic surveillance (sensors) model
● GRACE
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Overview of GRACE Algorithm
High-level architecture
● Ownship: initial state and constraints (intent)
● Intruders: initial states and constraints (if known)
Threats for all detected intruders
SaaResolution: Solution => Cost
● Avoidance maneuver
● Ownship predicted trajectory
● New and unresolved threats
ThreatEvaluator
Intruders => mapping 
to 2D grids
SaaConflictResolver
Maneuvers => Solutions
Look-ahead time and
Separation standards
Maneuvers
TPConstraints
Trajectory
Ownship constraints
StateThreatDetector
Intruder state Ownship state
Ownship state at CPA
1st Threat
Cost factors
Cost
Threat?
Threat
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Generic Conflict Evaluator (GCE)
Key ideas
● Threat evaluation with configurable separation 
standards
● Grid-based mapping (Von Viebahn, Watkins)
Outputs
● All intruder states mapped to 2D cells for all timesteps 
up to a specified look-ahead time
● Violations of separation standards (threats) with Closest 
Points of Approach (CPA)
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Separation standards (multiple severity levels)
● Horizontal and vertical separation
● Horizontal miss distance
● Tau-separation, which can be a
simple tau:                  , or
modified tau:                          , or
altitude-dependent tau as defined by TCAS
sensitivity levels
● time to separation as a filtering condition.
Generic Conflict Evaluator (GCE)
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Key ideas
● Local optimization at CPA for highest priority threat
● Discretized solution space by considering a small set of 
simple maneuvers
● Each candidate resolution is represented by a single 
Trajectory Change Point (TCP)
● Call GCE to re-evaluate the candidate resolutions for all 
intruders
Outputs
● A set of conflict-free resolutions (one for each simple 
maneuver)
● The best (least cost) solution
Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA)
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TCP for linearized trajectories 
Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA)
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Evaluation of GRACE Algorithm
Parametric study
● 180 encounter geometries for demanding conditions
● Configurations
○ Baseline with “perfect” omnidirectional sensor and 
immediate execution of GRACE maneuvers
○ Directional airborne radar model paired with a 
tracker with and without sensor error (“noise”)
○ Model of delayed execution of GRACE maneuvers
NAS-wide study
● UAS missions and recorded VFR traffic for 24 hours
● Baseline configuration
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Evaluation of GRACE Algorithm
Metrics
Violations: any separation standard violated
NMAC: Near-Mid-Air-Collision zone (500 x 100 ft) penetrated
Predicted: per cycle (at every simulation timestep)
Actual: per encounter (at CPA)
Changes Per Encounter: number of changes in resolution 
type divided by the number of encounters
Failure Rate: a ratio of number of Actual Violations to 
number of encounters in %
SNMAC: separation at CPA relative to NMAC: exceed 100% 
for Actual NMAC; lower values correspond to larger 
separations
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● Resolved all conflicts that were not detected too late
● Number of changed resolutions per encounter
○ very low for perfect sensors
○ increased for noisy sensors due to large vertical 
errors of non-cooperative radar sensor
Evaluation of GRACE Algorithm
Parametric study: effect of surveillance system
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Evaluation of GRACE Algorithm
Parametric study: delayed pilot response
Even for largest pilot delay (20 sec):
● All NMACs avoided with a comfortable safety margin
● Less than 4% encounters with Well Clear violations
● ~1 changed resolution per encounter
Pilot delay assumed by GRACE (the algorithm delay): 15 sec
35
